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$ 
The, last four years have brought us back with the impact 
of a sudden blow to the consciousness that we still live in 
history; that our generation is but one of a long sequence 
leading back to the beginning of human destiny. Only a 
few years ago most of us seemed to believe that history was a 
thing of the past, and that we had cut loose from it; that we 
lived in a brave new age wholly different from those which 
had gone before; that the new ways of life we had devised 
had created a new mind and new modes of thought and new 
attitudes which made us no longer amenable to the forces 
that had hitherto been at work in human affairs. 
It was therefore with a good deal of a shock that we were 
rudely awakened to the realization that events were happen-
ing in our new age substantially like others that from time 
out of mind had repeated themselves through the centuries-
things we had supposed would never happen again and for 
which we were mentally quite unprepared. From that shock 
many, perhaps most, of us have not yet recovered. Our 
thinking is still confused and we have yet to regain the 
fortitude and ~ssurance which depend on understanding that 
we are only confronted with situations which men have 
faced in the past and will have to face again. 
The war has already exhibited one fact of which historical 
generalization might have given us reasonable assurance. I 
refer to the magnificent self-defense of England during the 
whole year when she stood alone against the might of Hitler's 
power, and with spirit unbroken successfully resisted the 
most terrific attack in the records of warfare. From the time 
of Rome's resistance to Hannibal down through Napoleon's 
wars, it has become evident that successful self -defense in 
warfare depends as much on national character as success in 
life depends on personal character. In speaking of national 
character I do not, of course, refer to unfounded theories 
about race and blood; I refer to mental attitudes, determina-
tions, inhibitions, which characterize the preponderance of 
individuals who compose a nation. Of national character in 
this sense, a large part consists in tradition or inherited atti-
tudes, for character is a thing of slow growth; it is not char-
acter if it is something that springs into existence overnight. 
Tradition is to national character what habits are to personal 
character; and as personal character is not formed in a day 
or a year, so national character is not formed in one or two 
or three generations. It is tradition which binds the genera-
tions together into the character that gives strength for the 
present and the possibility of growth for the future; for the 
nation that is always changing its ways of life and its views 
of life has nothing on which to build a future. It may have a 
blueprint, but it has no foundation. 
It is especially appropriate to refer to this matter of na-
tional tradition at Williamsburg, because we stand here at the 
source and fountainhead of our American tradition. Here in 
the age of Anne, when this town was a new development, 
and the Capitol and Governor's palace were under construc-
tion an.d Colonel Byrd and Governor Spotswood walked 
these streets, there were first exhibited on American soil 
the large enterprise, the executive management, the confident 
building for the future, the opportunity to produce in two 
or three generations a breed fit for government and leader-
, ship, which have ever since been characteristic and fruitful 
traits of American national life. 
As the efforts of scholars bring to light in increasing meas-
ure the records of the Virginia tidewater in the age of Anl)e, 
the great age of Williamsburg, it becomes apparent that a 
modern American would have been far more at home with 
Colonel Byrd or Robert Carter or Thomas Lee, would have 
understood them and recognized his own type of life in theirs 
to a far greater degree, than in the case of their New England 
contemporaries, or even their contemporaries of New York 
or Philadelphia. And here we also stand at the fountainhead 
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of our special American tradition of government through 
law; that tradition which, drawn from English sources and 
built on the teachings of Locke and Somers and Holt, was 
developed first by Wythe and afterward by his pupil, John 
Marshall, greatest of all lawyers ancient or modem, into the 
ultimate philosophy of free government. 
It is well that Americans from all parts of the country 
come here to Williamsburg to admire the architecture and 
the interior decorations and the furniture. It should improve 
their taste and do something to prepare their minds for the 
attitudes and values and standards of judgment with which 
these external things are in conformity, and of which they 
were the outward expressions. But the thing of greatest 
value, if we would carry forward our national tradition and 
thereby strengthen the national character of which that tra-
dition is at the heart, is the mental atmosphere which pre-
vailed here, and which, spreading westward and northward 
and southward, came to consti~ute the quintessence of the 
American way of life as we have known it through the 
better part of two centuries. 
I. 
It may therefore be of interest as well as timely to inquire 
into a recent and now widely prevalent attitude toward an 
important phase of this American way of life. I refer to the 
phase of it which is represented by its sense of personal 
responsibility, the high value it set on industry and enterprise 
and on the willingness of individuals to take risks and abide 
by the results, and its emphasis on home, family life and the 
, duty of founding a family of well equipped and enterprising 
descendants. 
This view of life carried with it by necessary implication 
a philosophy of government. To that philosophy in its main 
outlines, all parties and factions among our people, however 
great their differences on other points, have staunchly adhered 
until very recently. The essence of that philosophy was 
that the function of government is to promote and foster in 
human individuals the attitudes and qualities I have just de-
scribed, to create and protect free scope for the exercise 
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of those qualities, and otherwise limit itself to arbitrating dif-
ferences between individuals and groups which have passed 
beyond a certain pitch of intensity. In short, the building 
of the nation was to be the work of countless individuals, 
striving, planning, toiling, competing and cooperating, and 
not the work or responsibility of government. This was 
thought to be democratic, because the energy, the initiative, 
the intelligence came from below, from anywhere and every-
where among the people at large, and not from above, from 
the limited circle of government officials. 
Today this phase of our national tradition is being brought 
into question. It is pointed out that in many ways our mode 
of life has been revolutionized since Colonel Byrd and Gov-
ernor Spotswood walked in Duke of Gloucester Street, or 
even since the covered wagons made their dusty way along 
the Santa Fe Trail only a hundred years ago. The frontier 
has disappeared, the country has filled up. We have 
the railroad, the telephone, the airplane, the wireless, anni-
hilating space and bringing distant places together. The great 
inventions have resulted in mass production, and mass pro-
duction has been made possible only by the growth of giant 
corporations which tower, it is said, over the life of the 
country, although in a relative point of view perhaps hardly 
so much as the great families of Virginia towered over Wil-
liamsburg in the age of Anne and the Georges. 
Nevertheless it is pointed out truthfully that these modem 
developments have been fraught with possibilities of enor-
mous economic disorder, that these possibilities have in recent 
years become actualities, that at times millions of people have 
been unable to find work, that the savings of other millions 
have been wiped out by failure of their investments. It is 
therefore suggested that the time is at hand for a large-scale 
revision of our traditional conception of the duties and 
responsibilities of government. 
In the name of democracy and the common man it is urged 
that this revision should take the direction of what is called a 
planned society; a society where economic crises are avoided 
and individuals are guaranteed security against idleness, want, 
and fear by pla~ing the nation's economy under government 
[6 ] 
planning. It is pointed out that many of our troubles under 
a regime of large-scale industry have proceeded from im-
properly directed and un-coordinated effort. Manufacturers 
have produced more of an article than they could find a 
market for, and in consequence have had to shut their plants 
and throw their employees out of work. Others by the use 
of borrowed capital have built plants for which there was no 
need, have therefore defaulted in paying their debts, and so 
have brought ruin to banks and investors. These malad-
justments are due, it is said to defective coordination between 
the parts of our national economic machine, which can be 
cured and should be cured by proper planning; and neces-
sarily such planning must be the task of the central govern-
ment as the only agency having an over-all view of the life of 
our people as a whole. 
This argument for coordination and planning carries a 
strong appeal to both reason and sentiment. It seems entirely 
rational that human effort should be productive and not self-
defeating, that the wastes incidental to un-coordinated effort 
should be eliminated, and that there should be the same ad-
justment of tasks and resources in the national household 
which characterizes a well-ordered private household. 
The appeal to sentiment and humanitarian feeling is even 
stronger. We have seen so much misery caused by no fault 
of the sufferer that we feel a sense of moral obligation to 
further any policy which promises alleviation. We feel that 
the problem is urgent, that it is one about which something 
must be done and done promptly. We find no comfort in 
the observation that, comparing the large-scale economy of 
our own time to the relatively smaller-scale economies of the 
past, maladjustments and resulting want are in fact not so 
great today as they once were under more primitive condi-
tions. Such an answer fails to satisfy, because today the 
social conscience is keener, our sense of human obligation is 
more compelling; and for these reasons the argument for 
socialized planning carries a strong appeal. 
There are other considerations which enhance the appeal. 
For one thing there is the appeal of novelty, always strong 
and especially so today. Planning is presented as something 
called for, made necessary by, and especially adapted to, the 
new conditions of life of which we are today so acutely self-
conscious. The achievements of chemistry and electricity 
have so thoroughly convinced most of us that we live in an 
entirely new world that it seems only appropriate to adopt a 
new conception of government, irrespective of other reasons. 
Again there is the attitude with which, as a result of our 
participation in the war, we view our heroic allies, the Rus-
sian people. The magnificent stand they have made against 
the invaders of their homeland has evoked to the full the 
generous American spirit of admiration for resistance to 
oppression. But the Russians have lived for years under the 
nearest thing to a completely planned economy that has been 
known in the modern world; and it is only natural to infer 
that this must be largely, if not completely, responsible for 
the magnificent strength and prowess they have so unexpect-
edly displayed. There are doubtless many who cannot help 
feeling that the case for a planned economy has been proved 
on the battlefields of Stalingrad and Smolensk. 
Finally it is obvious that to some extent and in some degree 
there has always and everywhere been a certain amount of 
governmental planning. The very idea of government car-
ries with it a recognition of the need for centralized authori-
tative public action to introduce into human relations kinds of 
order and regularity and organization that would not exist 
otherwise. 
The principle thus admitted, what valid ground, it is asked, 
can be put forward to limit its application? As regulation 
has in recent years extended step by step from one thing to 
another, this has usually been because the prior regulation 
could not accomplish its purpose unless additional matters 
were brought under government control. So much is already 
determined by governmental policy that it has come to be 
accepted that many private rights are no longer enjoyed save 
on government sufferance. To that extent what used to be 
called socialism is already with us. Government already has 
the responsibility for so much of the national life that it 
cannot successfully discharge that responsibility unless it is 
made completely responsible for the whole. This of course 
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entails the frank admission that the individual has no rights, 
legal or otherwise, against government, and so may be said ac-
tually to belong to the government; but this, it is said, need 
cause no fear because government will be democratic govern-
ment, devoted to the public interest and the welfare of the 
common man. 
The last argument which I have just outlined makes a 
planned economy seem inevitable as only the necessary 
further consequence of steps already taken and which can-
not be retraced. The argument has the merit of bringing out 
that planned economy like everything else is a matter of 
degree, of more or less. Its fallacy lies in assuming that be-
cause we have a certain amount of a thing we ought neces-
sarily to have more of it. Often the contrary may be true. 
A thing may be advantageous to a point and beyond that 
point deleterious. Most human decisions consist in finding 
some satisfactory middle point between extremes; and cer-
tainly a planned economy in the sense in which it is being 
urged is extreme because it contemplates total and complete 
subjection of all individuals within a state to whatever pur-
poses and directions government as the planning agency may 
choose to give to any or all of their actions and resources. 
They must be ready to do or not do whatever government 
orders, since otherwise there would not be and could not be 
planning of the kind represented as necessary. 
In view of the obvious variance between a planned society 
of this kind and our traditional American conception of gov-
ernment, it seems not inappropriate here at Williamsburg, at 
the fountainhead of that tradition, to indulge in a brief inquiry 
as to what, if anything, experience has to tell us concerning 
the workings and results of planned societies. Possibly there 
are blind irresistible forces at work which will transmute us 
into such a society whether we will or no; but the surest 
way to create such forces is to believe that they exist. It is 
worthwhile to reason about public affairs at all only on the 
supposition that the people have some choice about them; 
and to stop reasoning about them is an effective way of 
destroying that possibility of choice. 
Assuming, then, that it is not yet too late for reason to have 
some share in determining whether we are to have a planned 
society, it should be of interest to become acquainted with 
the relevant information; and since we are once more aware 
of history, and that we are living and acting in history, it 
may be in point to remind ourselves that history is the only 
laboratory of political knowledge and the only source of 
experience to which men can tum for information about 
political affairs. 
II. 
Leaving trivial and relatively incomplete instances out of 
account, there are available for observation five major ex-
amples of what is today called a planned society-that is to 
say, one in which land and other natural resources, and the 
labor and activities of the population, are all disposed of in 
ways directed by the State. In view of the conception of 
socialized planning as something necessitated by our special 
modem conditions of large-scale technology, it is interesting 
to note that the first, and in some ways the most complete, 
example of a planned society is the earliest and oldest state 
known to history, Egypt of the Pharaohs. For more than 
three thousand years, from the dawn of recorded time with 
occasional lapses and interruptions, the disposition of all the 
land in the lower Nile Valley and the occupations of prac-
tically all its working inhabitants were dictated by govern-
ment. We can only guess at the reasons for this, but they are 
tolerably clear. The rich lands of the valley could be made 
to produce their maximum yield only by a system of organ-
ized irrigation which called for highly centralized manage-
ment. The product being at the disposal of government was 
stored in good years for consumption in lean years, as we are 
told in the story of Joseph. 
Under this system surplus food and labor were available 
in such quantities that they could be employed for centuries 
in the gigantic public-works project of pyramid-building. 
Doubtless without the system many inhabitants of Egypt 
would have lacked the assurance of food and shelter which 
the system gave them, and which drew the children of Israel 
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to the proverbial Egyptian fleshpots. The inhabitants of 
Egypt had a security which contrasted favorably with the 
uncertain life of the desert Bedouins. But for this security 
they paid a price-subjection to the lash of the taskmaster; 
and the one fact about ancient Egyptian life which has 
burned itself most deeply into the consciousness of later gen-
erations is that God heard the bitter cry of sorrow which 
went up by reason of the taskmasters, and promised to deliver 
His people out of the hand of the Egyptians. 
Ancient history offers one other outstanding example of a 
completely planned or managed society-that of Sparta. Cer-
tainly Sparta had no fleshpots, but her aim was nevertheless 
security, although of a different kind. In Sparta it was the 
poverty of the soil and not its richness which brought about 
the managed state. Population had to be kept down and there 
was compulsory exposure of infants. The tillers of the soil; 
the Helots, were slaves of the State subject to be worked, 
punished or liquidated as the discretion of the government 
determined. 
The soldiers were the citizens, the ruling caste with a voice 
in government. They were permitted to own land, but could 
neither sell their lots nor buy others, and they were made to 
contribute their surplus produce to the public tables at which 
all male citizens were required to feed. No citizen was al-
lowed to possess any precious metal or engage in any remun-
erative occupation. His entire time had to be spent in drill-
ing, or in sports preparatory for war. No one was allowed 
to enter or leave the country without a permit. Food, dress, 
architecture, music were regulated and the knowledge of 
reading and writing was discouraged. Home life was ren-
dered almost impossible. Children were reared in public 
barracks and domestic ties were negligible. In Plutarch's 
words, the Spartans were accustomed to regard themselves as 
bees, simply members and parts of one common whole, for 
which they lived rather than for themselves.1 
The end to which this discipline and management were 
directed was to maintain a powerful army in a very poor 
1 Plutarch, Lycurgus, c. 25. 
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country with few natural resources. This objective was so 
successfully attained that for several centuries the military 
power of Sparta was able to overawe Greece. Her success 
converted some Greek thinkers who lived in freer and more 
prosperous countries to the superiority of a managed society, 
and Plato's Republic is still the most convincing textbook on 
social planning. The way of life at Sparta appealed to the 
speculative mind, but Greeks of a more practical cast of 
thought remarked that it was not surprising that the Spartans 
faced death so bravely in battle, since a way of life such as 
theirs was scarcely preferable to death.2 
Obviously neither the Egyptian nor Spartan planned socie-
ties resulted in the kind of social order or individual lives 
that modern proponents of planning proclaim as their goal. 
Today planning is urged as a way to bring about a fuller and 
happier life for individuals, and a greater measure of security 
from want and fear. In a sense Egyptian and Spartan plans 
did accomplish just these results, but they did not do so in a 
way that specially appeals to the modern mind-to the minds 
of men accustomed to aspire to the enjoyment of material 
things and habituated to the vocabulary of freedom and 
personal self -expression. To find plans more congenial to 
our own mental climate we must come down to more recent 
planning experiments. 
There have been many attempts at some kind or degree of 
planning in the last three or four centuries, but most of them 
have to be passed over in a brief survey like this as either con-
fined to too small a local area, like the medieval rule of the 
guilds, or as not sufficiently totalitarian in the scope of their 
grasp on the nation's life. This is true, for example, of the 
so-called mercantilist economic philosophy, which guided the 
statecraft of most nations for a number of centuries and 
involved a good deal of government planning, but was pri-
marily limited to the field of foreign-trade relations. Again 
the French experiment in building a completely planned 
colonial society under the old regime in Canada was on too 
small a scale to afford a basis for generalization. The first 
2 Athenaeus iv, 15. 
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large-scale modern experiment in total planning was an inci-
dent of the French Revolution. 
In 1793 when the Jacobin faction came at last into power 
it undertook to extend earlier measures of State control into 
a widespread scheme of governmentally directed economy. 
More than half the land and moneyed capital in the nation 
was, or had already 1;>een, confiscated and brought under gov-
ernment ownership. Property of any and every kind was 
subjected to requisition by the government at whatever price 
it chose to pay. Banks and financial corporations were abol-
ished. All prices were fixed at artificially low levels for the 
benefit of the poor. All incomes above very low minima were 
confiscated by taxation and the proceeds turned over to com-
mittees of philanthropy to improve the condition of the poor. 
Manufacturers and merchants were required under pain of 
death to continue in business at a loss until their funds were 
finally exhausted. A program of forced labor was introduced 
under which artisans, mechanics and farm laborers were 
forbidden to leave their occupations or were required to 
work at government direction. 
The French revolutionary experiment in national planning 
did not have an opportunity to work itself out into a devel-
oped and settled national policy. It soon went to pieces 
when the faction which supported it lost control as a result 
of their excesses during the Reign of Terror. The experi-
ment is important chiefly because of its proclaimed purpose 
of benefiting the poor, a purpose which underlies most of the 
modern appeal of planning, and also because it developed 
measures and techniques which have a striking affinity to 
some of those adopted in the two great planning experiments 
of our Qwn time, the Russian and the German. 
The Russian experiment antedates the German by more 
than a decade. In origin, in proclaimed purpose, in program 
and techniques the two regimes have displayed notable differ-
ences. One originated in an uprising of the working class, 
the other drew much of its original strength from a desire to 
resist the workers. The Russians professed to pursue only 
the welfare of the workers and to make war on the so-called 
"bourgeoisie"; Hitler professes to seek the general good of 
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the whole German people and to aim at establishing a people's 
community, a "Volksgemeinschaft." _The Russians proceeded 
at once to confiscate all land and productive wealth; Hitler 
has not disturbed the title to private property, but has con-
tented himself with complete control over its use. And there 
are other differences as well, in the motives to which the two 
governments have appealed, in the form which their propa-
ganda has taken, and in the different scapegoats which they 
have selected to solidify their emotional hold on their sub-
jects. 
In spite of these differences, however, both the Russian 
and German experiments in planning have shown certain 
striking similarities in methods and results. Some of these 
may have been due to Hitler's deliberate imitation of the 
Russians. Others seem to reflect the normal and natural 
workings of a planned economy. If two movements, starting 
from such different points of origin, professing such different 
objectives, and resembling each other only in the one particu-
lar of total planning, eventuate in identical or similar results, 
it would seem to follow that there is something in the task 
and conditions of national planning which produces those 
results. This conclusion will be fortified if similar results 
are observed in the planned economies of the past. 
III. 
The first outstanding characteristic of all planned econo-
mies is that political authority or government is neces-
sarily highly concentrated and centralized in a very few 
hands. In other words, not merely must the government 
have full and complete power to dispose of all persons and 
property so as to carry the plan into execution, not merely 
must all individuals therefore be without rights against the 
government, but the government itself must be so concen-
trated that it can formulate, and if necessary · alter, its plan 
promptly, decisively apd firmly, without delay, controversy 
or friction. The whole idea of a plan requires that it shall 
be consistent and continuous. This means that it cannot be 
made subject to daily fluctuations and differences of opinion 
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or purpose, or it would cease to have the advantages of a 
plan; it would become merely a succession of possibly incon-
sistent and contradictory governmental fiats. Accordingly in 
a planned community government cannot be a debating 
society and cannot even have in its controlling membership 
a large enough number of persons to develop conflicting 
views that Inight be difficult to reconcile. If such a condition 
develops, it therefore inevitably results in the expulsion of the 
dissenters through a purge or otherwise. 
This characteristic of government in all planned societies 
has been especially apparent in the modern experiments, 
where there has been a greater tendency than in Egypt or 
Sparta for a variety of different views and opinions to 
obtrude themselves. These have necessarily been rigorously 
suppressed. Subordination to a unified purpose has been so 
emphasized as to be identified with the kind of liberty that 
the plan is supposed to promote. "We will make France a 
cemetery rather than not regenerate it in our own way," 
declared a spokesman for the Jacobins.3 
The devices by which this concentration of power has 
been achieved have not been dissimilar. In revolutionary 
France the Jacobin clubs which constituted only a very small 
proportion of the adult population rigorously excluded all 
others by force from participating in the government. The 
Jacobin deputies who constituted only a Ininority of the 
members of the Convention prevented the rest from having 
a voice in its decisions. Gouverneur Morris, a contemporary 
observer, reported that "the present government is a despo-
tism. The Convention consists of only a part of those who 
were chosen: These after putting under arrest their fellows 
claim 1111 power and have delegated the greater part of it to a 
Committee of Safety."4 
The similarities to the organization of the Russian govern-
ment are obvious, with one important exception. In the first 
place even theoretical participation in government is denied 
in Russia to all save members of the Communist Party, which 
SH. A. Taine, French Revolution, (Eng. tr.), Vol. III, p. 61. 
4 Morris to George Washington, October 18, 1793, in J. Sparks, Lite 
and Correspondence ot Gouverneur Morris, Vol. II, p. 369. 
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some years ago numbered less than two per cent of the adult 
population.5 Secondly the function of the party members is 
limited to the election of an annual Congress which is a mere 
ratification meeting to approve decisions of the party central 
committee. At one meeting of this Congress an opposition 
attempted to make itself heard with the result that the dissent-
ers were subsequently sent to Siberia.6 All real power is in 
the hands of a subcommittee of the Party Central Committee, 
the so-called Polit-buro, consisting of nine members, and 
when there was an important difference in this Committee a 
number of years ago four of the leading members were ex-
pelled and subsequently purged and liquidated. 
The one respect in which Russia has proceeded beyond the 
French Jacobins is to vest practically supreme power in the 
hands of a single individual, the Secretary-General of the 
Party, who is referred to as the vozhd or leader. The essen-
tial resemblance to the German form of organization is ob-
vious. So essential is unity of purpose and control to the very 
idea of planning that any other form of organization would 
be unthinkable, and would defeat the whole purpose of a 
planned society in any intelligible sense. It is therefore only 
an evidence of confused thinking that so many humanitarian 
liberals who welcomed the advent of planning in Russia dis-
played shocked amazement when the government which 
emerged proved to be a centralized despotism. This was 
necessary and inevitable once the premise of a planned society 
is accepted. 
A second necessary characteristic of a planned society is 
that the central government must have in its service a suffi-
ciently large corps of loyal and devoted dependents scattered 
among the people to keep watch over their movements, report 
on their reactions and ensure by all possible means their 
obedience. This is essential to maintain the power which the 
government needs if it is to perform its function. Doubtless 
it would not be necessary if all human beings thought alike, 
if all were motivated by pure reason and if all the decisions 
of an absolute government were in conformity to reason. 
5 w. R. Batsell, Soviet Rule in Russia, p. 700. 
6 Batsell, op. cit., pp. 725-6. 
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Needless to say this is not the c:ase, and absolute governments 
whose decisions are certain to offend one or another element 
in the population are no less zealous than other governments 
to maintain themselves in power by whatever means are 
most effective for suppressing opposition. These means take 
various forms. One is to fill posts of influence and distinction 
with loyal party adherents who are dependent on govern-
ment favor and bounty. Another is the more sinister insti-
tution of a secret police vested with power of summary pun-
ishment. This institution is found in a fully developed form 
in the Krypteia of ancient Sparta, whose task was to spy on 
the Helots, and which on one occasion is said to have executed 
two thousand of them in a single coup. Modern instances 
which need no elaboration are the Gestapo in Germany and 
the Ogpu in Russia. 
The necessity of operating through an organization of po-
litical or party dependents leads to a third characteristic of 
planned societies which has an important consequence for the 
effectiveness of the planning itself and its execution. Today 
the case for planning rests largely on economic considerations. 
Modern well-being has come to be thought of so largely in 
terms of economic goods and as so ultimately dependent on 
production, distribution, employment and the like, that the 
economic conception of planning is paramount. Accordingly 
planning, in theory and as it is advocated, should give fore-
most consideration to purely economic efficiency. It is in 
fact one of the chief arguments for a planned society that 
such a society is able to do this more successfully than the 
crude politically operated governments to which we have be-
come accustomed. 
The strength of this argument is seriously weakened by the 
necessity to which I have just referred of maintaining loyal 
party dependents in posts of power. This results in the man-
agement of the managed economy falling largely into -the 
hands of a political class who have no industrial experience or 
ability and who override the decisions of their technical sub-
ordinates for political purposes. This development has been 
noted by all commentators on Germany and Russia. In Ger-
many it is reported that every factory is in charge of a so-
called "factory-leader" whose position is said to be a contra-
dictory one. While he is in charge of production, he is at 
the same time a cog in the party machine and the party 
authorities interfere with his management while holding him 
responsible for filling his production program. 
The same condition is reported in Russia. It is said that 
the position of technical industrialists and production man-
agers is difficult because they are everywhere working under 
the orders of party men who know nothing about the enter-
prise they control, since their retention in their posts depends 
not on knowledge or capacity, but upon being politically 
reliable. When things go wrong these party representatives 
always throw the blame on the specialists who work under 
them, accusing the latter of being wreckers and counter-revo-
lutionaries.7 In at least one notable instance the technicians 
were tried and convicted of sabotage for adhering to produc-
tion estimates which subsequently proved to be correct. 
Obviously the condition just described seriously impairs 
the supposed effectiveness of planning to accomplish the re-
sults expected of it and which are urged in its justification. 
There is an even more fundamental factor working in the 
same direction. This arises from the necessity that in every 
planned society the central authority must answer the ques-
tion, what shall the plan be? There must be a certain amount 
of concreteness in a plan, however broadly conceived, and if 
there is to be actual planning rather than a mere acceptance of 
the theory of planning, answers must sooner or later be found 
for such very specific questions as, who is to get what? Who 
is to give up what? 
At this point difficulty begins. In a complex modern so-
ciety with countless groups and interests making claims that 
cannot all be satisfied, and often shifting their claims from 
year to year, government, if it is to direct the economic proc-
ess in accordance with a plan must assume responsibility for 
making a final and conclusive determination of all such claims. 
Doubtless this was not the case in such a simple society as 
Sparta, where effectiveness in war was the sole objective of 
the plan. Today it is inherent in the very economic situation-
7F, Utley, The Dream We Lost, p. 227. 
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which is thought to create the need for planning. Usually an 
effort is made to shove the difficulty into the background by 
appealing to some general term like "public interest." Robes-
pierre brushed the problem aside by proclaiming that "Our 
sublime principle supposes a preference for public interests 
over all private interests."8 The Russians say that their ob-
jective is to abolish the exploitation of man by man and estab-
lish a classless society. The Nazis announce that their goal is 
the general good of the German people and the prevention of 
individuals from furthering their private interests at the ex-
pense of society. 
But th~ problem will not down in this way. "Public in-
terest" and "general good" are phrases which serve to conceal 
the competition of interests that goes on behind them. To 
talk of a classless society is futile so long as different human 
beings do different things which bring them into competition 
or controversy. There is always a question as to whose in-
terest for the moment is in accord with the supposed general 
interest, and by what standard the general interest in specific 
cases is to be judged. Everything depends on the kind of 
considerations which are resorted to in giving an answer to 
these questions. . 
If national planning has the merit it is supposed to have, 
these fundamental questions must be answered, or at least an 
attempt made to answer them, in an impartial spirit and from 
the standpoint of a disinterested attempt to increase the 
national product or the national productive capacity. That 
this is by no means alw~ys the case is shown by what we hear 
from Germany. Old-fashioned political considerations of a 
familiar kind seem largely to govern. Thus we are told that 
"the small shopkeepers have the least political influence and 
make the easiest scapegoats when there is an unpopular rise 
in prices. The price commissar has granted innumerable 
price increases to manufacturers at the expense of retailers."9 
In other words, the processes of logrolling and pressure-poli-
tics so familiar in popularly elected assemblies do not disappear 
under a planned economy, but are merely driven back into 
8 Taine, French Revolution (Eng. tr.), III, 88. 
9 G. Reimann, The Vampire Economy, p. 83. 
the secret cabinet of the planning authority. One of the very 
conditions which planning professes to remove is found to 
persist under it. "Plus s:a change, plus c'est la meme chose." 
But there is an even graver difficulty in every planned 
society when the central authority is called on to decide what 
is to be the goal of the plan. Most of the discontented groups 
who welcome planning as a way of satisfying their desires 
answer at once that it is to raise their standard of living, mak~ 
more economic goods immediately available to them, and 
decrease the productive effort required of them. To accede 
to these demands in full would be to sacrifice the future to 
the present. Private capital, saving, and investment having 
all been abolished, the maintenance and enlargement of the 
national plant must necessarily be at the expense of the 
present income of the workers. There must be compulsory 
saving through something akin to taxation, the proceeds to be 
invested in plant by the government. Accordingly one of 
the largest, if not the largest, economic issue facing the gov-
ernment of a planned society in modem times is to decide 
between the claims of the future and the present. 
It is of interest that in making this decision both the Rus-
sian and German governments alike have strongly favored the 
future; that is to say, they have diverted effort from making 
consumers' goods, and have proportionately held down or 
reduced the present standard of living, for the purpose of 
building new plants and further increasing the supply of 
producers' goods. This emphasis on plant expansion has been 
the dominant feature of both the German and Russian econo-
mies. It is especially noteworthy because it represents on 
the part of these socialist plans an exaggeration of one of the 
very tendencies which advocates of planning have most se-
verely criticized in capitalistic society-namely, the tendency 
to subtract too large an amount from the current comforts 
and pleasures of the present generation in the speculative hope 
of producing more in the future. What has been called 
"oversaving" was a leading charge in the indictment against 
the functioning of free enterprise during the nineteen-twen-
ties; yet "oversaving" in the same sense has nowhere been 
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carried so far as in the planned economIes during the last 
dozen years. 
Indeed it was carried so far in Russia as practically to result 
in famine conditions and in Germany to lead to the strictest 
rationing of elementary comforts. The wisdom of such a plan 
from both the social and economic standpoints is open to 
question. Needless to say, it involves the risk of tremendous 
wastes of effort from possible miscalculations and erroneous 
predictions. In any event, to use a vivid phrase, the policy 
involves "putting a steel hoop around consumption" ;10 and 
"whether the immediate interests of the living generation are 
unduly sacrificed to the hypothetical desires and needs of 
generations yet to come is arguable."l1 It is at least clear that 
under a planned economy operating on a program of this 
character, which rigorously thwarts present appetites and 
denies present satisfactions, there is an ever-present danger of 
grave popular discontents. The possibility of these discon-
tents, the chance that large bodies of people may not like the 
government's plan or its results, is a thing with which all 
planned societies have to reckon; and especially so in an age 
like the present, when, even in Germany and Russia, public 
opinion is a factor which cannot be completely ignored. 
Accordingly one of the common characteristics of planned 
societies has always been a strict control and regimentation 
of opinion. In part this has taken the form of creating an 
atmosphere and mental climate of fear through the unseen 
but ever-present power of such institutions as the Krypteia, 
the Ogpu and the Gestapo; in part there has been recognition 
that opinion cannot be effectively controlled through repres-
sive measures alone, but that it has to be moulded through 
affirmative measures of suggestion, propaganda and mysticism. 
This artificial moulding of a nation's mind to the require-
ments of the governmental plan through studied stimulation 
of motives, emotions and attitudes is accordingly an out-
standing characteristic of all planned economies. In ancient 
Egypt it was accomplished largely through the dominance of 
10 E. Friedman, Russia in Transition, p. 93. 
11 L. E. Hubbard, Soviet Trade and Distribution (London, 1938), pp. 
343-345· 
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a powerful state-religion whose priests and cults were at the 
disposal of the government. The French Revolutionary gov-
ernment sought to achieve the same result by civic festivals, 
fraternal banquets, "feasts of reason" and the so-called cult 
of the Supreme Being. Substantially similar devices in Nazi 
Germany are the Youth Movement, the marching parades, 
the cult of "Strength Through Joy" and the religion of race; 
while in Russia there have been introduced the deification of 
Lenin and what amounts to a mystic worship of dynamos, 
power-plants and tractors. 
A darker aspect of this planned control over human atti-
tudes is that it has been felt necessary by the governments of 
planned societies to solidify the loyalty of their subjects, and 
stimulate enthusiasm to the point of enduring the sacrifices 
which the plan entails, by selecting as a scapegoat some ele-
ment of the population against which the hatred of the rest 
can be focused and concentrated. Antagonism and hatred 
shared in common against a common object are unfortunately 
among the most powerful and most readily available human 
motives to produce mass cooperation and divert attention 
from the inconveniences and suffering which such coopera-
tion may require; and this has been soon learned and well 
learned in every planned society of which we have knowl-
edge. Each and all have been built largely around the motive 
of punishing, persecuting and oppressing some hated group. 
At Sparta it was the Helots; during the French Revolution the 
aristocrats, emigres, and capitalists; in Nazi Germany the 
Jews; and in Soviet Russia the bourgeois, the NEP men and 
the Kulaks. 
The persistent persecution of these classes has not only 
given the rest of the population a sense of the necessity of 
holding together for a common task, but has also inspired 
them with a feeling of mastery and superiority which has 
caused them to overlook their privations and, what is perhaps 
even more effective, has stimulated in them a spirit of fanati-
cism and blind devotion to a cause or an "ideal" which has 
inoculated them against the influence of more rational consid-
erations. The extent to which emphasis has been placed on 
motives of this kind is illustrated by the following report of 
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the Russian persecution of the Kulaks, or well-to-do small 
farmers. We are told that: 
"In villages where there was a dead level of 
poverty, the Soviets were nevertheless ordered to 
find Kulaks even where none existed~ Some families 
must be designated as such even if there were no 
exploiters or usurers. Dr. Calvin B. Hoover relates 
how, in one village where he visited, the local chair-
man of the Committee of the Poor exhibited to him 
a family of. Kulaks quite in the manner of showing 
one a family of lepers on whom the judgment of 
God had fallen . . . . When the query was put as 
to why the family was regarded as a Kulak one, 
he replied that someone had to be a Kulak, and that 
this family had many years before owned a village 
inn. They no longer did so, but there was appar-
ently no hope of their ever losing their status as a 
Kulak family. If they did, there was no other fam-
ily to take their place as Public Enemy, and for 
some reason unknown to anyone, the Soviet Gov-
ernment insisted that each village must produce at 
least one Kulak family to be oppressed."12 
This characteristic of planned society in relying upon and 
stimulating mass-hatred against an oppressed group is espec-
ially repugnant to the humanitarian and philanthropic urge 
of our time from which so much of the demand for a planned 
society proceeds. It is an ugly fact which most of us would 
like to brush aside or stigmatise as peculiar to Germany. The 
same thing is true of the depressingly low standards of living, 
the starvation level of consumption, which have been necessi-
tated by both the Russian and German plans and which an 
effort is made to explain away as only incidental to getting 
the plan into operation, as only a preliminary to the happy 
new day that is to come in the future. What right have we, 
asks an occasional disappointed liberal who expected much of 
12 Utley, The Dream We Lost, p. 53. 
the planning experiments, to impose all this suffering on the 
generation of the living in the hope that our plan, or any plan 
conceived and executed by any group of planners, will com-
pensate for the wreckage by the supposed benefits it will 
bestow on generations yet unborn? 13 
We are thus brought to the question of the extent to which 
planning, in the light of experience, has lived up to its promise 
of performing the major task expected of it by its proponents 
and urged as the principal reason for adopting it-the task, 
namely, of controlling the operation of economic forces under 
modern conditions of technology, avoiding and smoothing 
out maladjustments, and ensuring an orderly and rational 
relationship between production and use, supply and demand. 
If a planned economy is instituted, to what extent can it be 
expected that the national consumption will be accurately 
anticipated and evenly matched by production, so that so-
called "crises" will be avoided? In approaching this problem 
a planned economy has one decided advantage. It has one 
of the variables under its control-it can absolutely dictate 
consumption by resorting, if necessary, to universal rationing. 
In effect the planned economies have done this, so that their 
only problem has been that of production, of compelling 
enough to be produced to meet the consumption program, 
high or low, which the government dictates without regard 
for the desires, tastes and preferences of the people. 
There has already been a sufficient length of experience in 
the Soviet State to afford some basis for judgment as to its 
success or failure in this direction. The experience of Ger-
many 'has been more brief and little information is available. 
In Russia, as might have been expected, there has all along 
been difficulty in meeting production schedules. Plants have 
been built in the wrong places with respect to raw materials 
or transportation facilities, resulting in delayed output. Oth-
ers have been built too large or too small for maximum effi-
ciency. Inefficient management or political management has 
slowed down production. Products composed of a number of 
parts supplied by different plants have been held up because 
13 Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, p. 203. 
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some of the parts could not be obtained in as large quantities 
as others. Some industries have not been able to obtain suffi-
cient raw materials. 
Of course these things occur under the system of private 
enterprise with which we are familiar. It is human to make 
mistakes and businessmen make them with a certain amount 
of damage, and often a very large amount of damage, to 
others. But it is now clear that planners, and those upon 
whom they depend to carry out their plans, also make them. 
The difference is in scale, in degree. Where there is a num-
ber of completely separate private enterprises some may make 
mistakes, while others do not, and a rough balance may be 
struck for a great deal of the time. If an error is made in one 
place it may be corrected somewhere else. A separate con-
cern may repair its mistakes without involving a change of 
national policy. On the other hand where the industry of a 
whole nation is under central control and rigidly coordinated 
as planning requires, a mistake anywhere may result in dis-
location everywhere and apparently this has happened fre-
quently in Russia and doubtless also in Germany. 
Reporting on Russia, an English economist concludes that 
planning has not eliminated economic crises, but has only 
caused them to appear under somewhat different forms from 
those to which we are accustomed. He says: 
"Neither has the Soviet Union escaped crises, 
different in form, but as expensive and disturbing as 
the crises which occur in the unplanned economics 
of capitalist states. Between 1928 and 1932 the 
total head of domestic livestock declined by roughly 
half; in the winter of 1932-1933 large agricultural 
regions were visited by famine which resulted in 
two million deaths. Some branches of national 
economy have over-fulfilled their plans, while oth-
ers have failed by considerable margins to realize 
them .... In a capitalist system such circumstances 
would result in insolvencies and unemployment in 
the affected industries. Such external symptoms are 
suppressed in the Soviet Union by price fixing and 
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by budgetary grants to cover the unplanned losses 
of industrial enterprises, but the disease is manifested 
in other forms .... The ultimate result of planning 
errors was a reduction in the consumption of the 
population . . . . 
"If an economic crisis be defined as an unpre-
dicted disturbance in the orderly development of 
production and consumption, resulting either in a 
shortage of goods or a shortage of effective demand, 
then the economic history of the Soviet Union, since 
planning superseded the relatively free market of 
N. E. P. has been a succession of crises, for at prac-
tically no period during that time has there not 
been a shortage of something . . . . If planning is 
immune from some of the defects of capitalism, it 
seems to possess peculiar faults of its own."14 
And another commentator concludes as follows: 
"For years past there has been a far more general 
anarchy in Soviet national economy than has ever 
been the case in capitalist economy even at times 
of worst crisis."15 
In any event, whatever may be thought of the effectiveness 
of planned societies in achieving economic efficiency and 
eliminating economic crises, there is one direction in which 
they have definitely proved their effectiveness, and for which 
they have always displayed a pec~liar fitness. It is a kind of 
effectiveness and fitness which is far removed from the pro-
fessions and supposed objectives of the humanitarian liberals 
who, in this country at least, are the leading proponents of 
government planning. It is effectiveness and fitness for war. 
All the planned, societies, ancient Egypt, Sparta, revolutionary 
France, Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, whatever their differ-
ences in other respects, have been powerful and effective 
military states. For this there are obvious reasons. 
14 L. E. Hubbard, Soviet Trade and Distribution, pp. 343-345. 
15 Utley, The Dream We Lost, p. 205. 
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The chief human characteristic of planned societies is the 
iron discipline to which their populations are and have to be 
subjected. Whatever the character of the plan and whatever 
the objectives it professes, the central directing authority 
understands from the outset that an attitude of complete 
unquestioning obedience by the people to the government 
must be created as a preliminary requirement, and that the 
principal effort of government must be devoted to creating 
this attitude and sustaining it. Experience shows that this 
can be done, and, if done effectively, the attitude persists no 
matter how far the plan falls short in actuality of realizing 
the promises and professions which constituted its original 
appeal. Not merely is this attitude of complete obedience 
highly valuable as an element of military effectiveness, but the 
devices which are generally used to create and maintain it 
have in themselves a military value. The parades, the festi-
vals, the mystic attitude toward the state and its ruler, all tend 
to produce a condition of mind which is valuable in war, and 
this is especially true of the spirit of hate and fanaticism 
against enemies or supposed enemies of the regime which we 
have seen that the rulers of planned societies do so much to 
stimulate. An attitude compounded of loyalty to the state 
and mystic savage ferocity against other human beings, coup-
led with habituation to privation and sacrifice, produces a 
generation of soldiers who may be almost irresistible for a 
succession of campaigns. 
It is therefore not remarkable that perhaps the fiercest and 
most intense war in history is being fought out today between 
the two great planned societies of modem Europe. The dis-
cipline, fanaticism and training in hardship which characterize 
the combatants on both sides made them from their very 
entry into the conflict foemen worthy of each other's steel. 
Democracies always require two or three years to organize 
themselves for battle; the discipline to which planned socie-
ties are inured makes them more effective from the outset. 
If a nation has an ambition to find its chief satisfaction in mili-
tary achievement, the acceptance of a planned regime is a 
good way to begin. 
IV. 
In this brief review there have been summarized the com-
mon characteristics of planned societies so far as experience 
and information are available. They are, first of all, an abso-
lute government unlimited in its powers, concentrated in a 
very few hands or in the hands of a single leader, and per-
mitting no discussion or difference of opinion; secondly, the 
filling of all posts of importance, economic and technical as 
well as governmental, with loyal dependents of the party 
machine; thirdly, the subtraction from the consuming power 
of the people of enough of the total national product to 
enable the government to make the capital investments and 
experiments that it deems desirable, even though there may 
thereby be entailed, and has hitherto always been entailed, a 
serious depression of the standard of living; fourthly, a distri-
bution of the consumable national income in part at least 
along political lines to maintain support for the government; 
fifthly, a rigid regimentation of opinion requiring resort to 
the use of a secret police; sixthly, the mass hypnotism of the 
people into a fanatical spirit of self-sacrifice, often stimulated 
by the deliberate persecution of some oppressed group; and 
finally, the development of an effective spirit and attitude 
of militarism. 
In the light of experience these are some of the results that 
would most certainly be produced by transforming a nation 
into a planned society. Of course they are not the results 
that are desired and advocated by those among us who are 
toying with the idea of planning, and who would almost cer-
tainly be liquidated if the planned society which they propose 
came into being, just as most of the early Bolsheviks were 
liquidated in due course. It is not the hard realities of a 
planned society that appeal to the advocates of planning; it is 
the feeling that something must be done to alleviate economic 
depressions and give greater security and larger incomes to 
the mass of the people. The actual experience does not indi-
cate that a regime of government planning will do these 
things; it certainly indicates that the planned regimes hitherto 
known have not done them; and it suggests that the very 
[ 28 ] 
· conditions of planning, the human agencies through which 
it must operate and the special nature of the obstacles which 
it must encounter, will prevent it from doing so. 
The great defect in the panacea of planning is that 'it con-
ceals problems and difficulties rather than solves them. In a 
free economy, we are fully aware of the friction, the conflict, 
the waste, the maladjustments that characterize the economic 
and social relations between men and groups of men. They 
are patent and their results in alternating periods of prosperity 
and depression are patent. The advocates of planning assume 
that by concentrating all power in a centralized agency, the 
factors of maladjustment will be removed. They will not be 
-they will disappear from the surface, only to be transformed 
into pressures operating on the agency from within; and with 
the additional difficulty of imposing upon the agency a 
responsibility too vast for human executive ability and judg-
ment. The central authority will inevitably seek to relieve 
itself of this strain by exerting its power to repress the active 
outside centers of initiative; and in doing so it will deaden the 
life and intelligence which are necessary for high productive 
effort and hence for a high standard of living. It substitutes 
a mechanical military kind of discipline for the organic spon-
taneous cooperation which is necessary for the works of 
peace. 
But if planning will not solve the problem of our genera-
tion, where are we to turn? This is doubtless the question 
that the considerations here advanced will evoke from the 
thoughtful and earnest men and women who sincerely desire 
a fuller and better life for our people. Of course it is a ques-
tion which could not be answered in much more time than I 
have already taken, and it is not the question I set out to 
answer; all that I proposed was to eliminate one widely dis-
cussed way of working toward the desired result. However, 
this much may be said: 
There is often much that government can properly and ad-
vantageously do to alleviate particular evils as they develop 
and disclose themselves in modern society. To this extent 
it may be said that there is a helpful kind of government plan-
ning, but it is planning how to deal with an evil rather than 
planning the arrangements of the society itself. If this kind 
of governmental action is extended in too many directions 
and to too many different problems at once it begins to suffer 
from a kind of law of diminishing returns-the various gov-
ernmental efforts get in each other's way. This is apt to lead 
to a demand for still more governmental interference with 
other things and to a demand for "coordination" of the vari-
ous governmental efforts. Out of these demands comes in 
turn the demand for a "planned society" -for vesting govern-
ment with a complete general power of making all the social 
and economic adjustments within the society that it regards 
as necessary to accomplish its purpose. 
This progression of ideas and tendencies from necessary 
governmental interference with some things to complete gov-
ernmental management of everything is so inexorable, partic-
ularly in the mental atmosphere and climate which prevail 
today, that it becomes desirable to bring ourselves face to 
face with what complete governmental management of so-
ciety would mean. That is accordingly what I have at-
tempted to do this evening. If when we look the prospect in 
the face it is not pleasing, then there is certainly suggested the 
conclusion that any proposal for an extension of the field of 
governmental control and management should be viewed with 
caution and that there is a presumption against it unless clear 
proof can be given that it will not create more problems and 
maladjustments than those which it promises to remove. Cer-
tainly the data of experience reviewed in what I have here 
said permit no other conclusion than that governmental man-
agement, so far from eliminating the maladjustments which 
irk us, is likely to produce other and even graver maladjust-
ments of the same character; and this should make us at least 
somewhat more tolerant and more patient of the maladjust-
ments incidental to the regime of free enterprise in which we 
have been bred. 
Any system of free enterprise, just because it is free and 
just because it permits and expects initiative and effort to 
spring up in unexpected places and in unexpected ways from 
anywhere and everywhere throughout the mass of the people, 
is bound to result in a good deal of conflict and competition 
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and disappointment and frustration and success and inequal-
ity. Success will not always be achieved by the most de-
serving, and failure is not always a stigma of incompetence. 
The rewards of life, under any social or political system, in-
dividualist or commUJ)ist, are always partly the result of 
chance and partly of rules of the game that are rough and 
ready and do not recognize the finer values. Sometimes all 
this competition and conflict and restless effort are drawn into 
directions which result in wholesale frustrations, failures, de-
struction of accumulations and unemployment. Within lim-
its there are things which government can do to alleviate the 
resulting individual suffering and to lessen the likelihood of 
its recurrence, but only within limits, whether we have a 
planned society or not. 
The maladjustments of life, economic, social and individual, 
are in part the result of conflict between human aims and 
purposes, in part of lack of foresight, lack of patience, lack of 
intelligence, lack of skill. The real tragedies are wheI1 some 
such lack on the part of one individual or a few individuals 
brings frustration and suffering to many. This is always more 
likely to happen as more power is concentrated in a few over 
the many, and especially as more power is concentrated in 
government; for the very essence of government is that the 
force of its decisions is felt by all and its failures and mistakes 
come home to all. A miscalculation by the absolute govern-
ment of a planned society can produce results more disastrous 
than a stock-market panic or a glut in the wheat-crop, or a 
shrinkage in the demand for steel. 
The argument for a planned economy assumes that govern-
ment will be all-wise and wholly disinterested, conditions not 
likely to occur; and it assumes also that the way to solve eco-
nomic difficulties and social difficulties is to suppress and iron 
out all conflicts and inequalities. Supposing that this could 
be done, which it cannot be, the loss would be greater than 
the gain; for it is precisely the conflicts, the competition, the 
shifting inequalities in the mass of the people that contain 
the hope of all progress and improvement and spell the 
meaning of democracy. 
Accordingly even if it could be proved that a planned 
society would eliminate some of the particular things that we 
feel today as evils in the system of free enterprise, we would 
not do wisely to change one system for the other because of 
all that we would lose; and in this connection there is a final 
consideration which is not always given due weight. I re-
ferred at the beginning to national tradition as corresponding 
in the body politic to character in an individual. A nation 
attempting to step out of its tradition is like an individual 
acting out of character. It leads to disintegration, ineffective-
~ess, paralysis of will, impotence of accomplishment. Neither 
the German nor the Russian people in submitting to planned 
economies stepped out of their traditions. Both had tradi-
tions of absolute government and social servitude. Both had 
traditions of dominant militarism. They have merely trans-
lated their traditions into forms more effective for modern 
purposes. 
Our American tradition is a different one. It is a tradition 
which vests initiative and decision in all individuals every-
where and calls the result democracy. It puts a man's fate at 
the mercy of his intelligence and skill and therefore holds him 
entitled to an education. It expects him to develop enter-
prise and therefore throws him on his own resources to find 
and hold a job if he can. It believes in incentive rather than 
compulsion and therefore insists that the right to acquire and 
own prop~rty shall be protected. It abhors the idea of men 
being supported by the government except in unusual emer-
gencies. It recognizes that a system of free enterprise does 
not automatically prevent booms and panics, but it believes 
that these may also occur under systems of government dicta-
tion, and that in the long run their effects can be overcome 
more satisfactorily by the efforts and decisions of thousands 
and millions of men and women than by the wisdom of a 
centralized government. This is the tradition which would 
have been as well understood at Williamsburg in the age of 
_ Queen Anne as by the men who are responsible for the opera-
tion of our industry today in North Carolina and Pennsyl-
vania, in Illinois and California. It is the tradition which we 
inherit from the Williamsburg period of our history. 
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We have not always kept this tradition in mind in shaping 
the course of our national policy, especially during the past 
half-century, and therein lies the source of many of our pres-
ent difficulties, especially those of the last twenty years. 
Necessarily there have had to be some readjustmnts of govern-
mental functions and some increase in governmental powers, 
but the line has not always been wisely understood between 
the things that government can advantageously do and those 
in which its inter:ference means ultimate mischief. Indeed the 
supposed collapse of our economy a dozen years ago was due 
not so much to the operation of economic forces as to the 
effect of the unwise governmental policies of prior years. 
In the face of this, many of us have not yet learned our lesson 
and are turning to more governmental interference as a cure 
for the evils that too mu~h governmental interference has 
caused. The point has at last been reached when some of the 
more advanced advocates of reform are suggesting a planned 
society with all that it involves. 
But there is one thing upon which we may pin our hope of 
turning back the tide. There is one point in which a planned 
economy outrages the deepest layer of our tradition, and 
which can be understood, I believe, by common men every-
where. A planned society is completely inconsistent with 
government by discussion and debate, with free elections and 
with legislation by representative assemblies. It does not 
tolerate compromise. It necessarily insists upon absolutism, 
upon supreme uncontrolled power in the ruler and his imme-
diate coterie of adviser~. Without this, as I have already 
pointed out,there can be no planned society, for a free legis-
lature could upset the plan at any time and would certainly 
do so. 
I do not believe that the American people are ready to ac-
cept this kind of absolutism. We may no longer know our 
history but hatred of absolutism is still in our blood and 
bones, at least in those of us who are of English descent. 
Our deepest roots go back to the time when England shook 
off the last shackles of an absolute king. The age of Anne, 
when Williamsburg was founded, was the dawn of that era 
of freedom finally achieved. All our most treasured national 
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memories ever since are linked with the onward march of 
political freedom. We are not yet ready to turn back the 
clock and plunge into the night that lies behind the Williams-
burg dawn. Williamsburg and what it stands for still have 
meaning for us. We are not yet ready to accept the Pharoahs 
and the old kings: 
"Over all things certain, this is sure indeed: 
Suffer not the old King, for we know the breed. 
,., ,., ,., ,., ,., ,., ,., 
He shall mark our goings, question when we came, 
Set his guards about us, as in Freedom's name. 
He shall take a tribute, toll of all our ware; 
,., 
He shall change our gold for arms-arms we may not bear. 
He shall break his judges if they cross his word; 
He shall rule above the law, calling on the Lord. 
He shall peep and mutter; and the night shall bring 
Watchers neath our window lest we mock the King. 
Hate and all division; hosts of hurrying spies; 
Money poured in secret, carrion breeding flies. 
,., ,., ,., ,., ,., ,., ,., 
Here is naught at venture, random nor untrue-
Swings the wheel full circle, brims the cup anew. 
,., 
Step by step and word for word; who is ruled may read, 
Suffer not the old Kings; for we know the breed." 
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